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Abstract
Network survivability is the ability of a network keeping
connected under failures and attacks, which is a
fundamental issue to the design and performance
evaluation of wireless ad hoc networks. Ad-hoc low power
wireless networks are in research in both sensing and
pervasive computing. The proposed method discusses
about resource depletion attacks at the routing protocol
layer, which drains battery power. The motivation of a
large portion of research efforts has been to maximize the
lifetime of the network, where network lifetime is typically
measured from the instant of deployment to the point when
one of the nodes has expanded its limited power source and
becomes in-operational – commonly referred as first node
failure. A novel approach for routing protocols, affect from
attack even those designed to be protected, be short of
protection from these attacks, which call Vampire attacks,
which permanently disable networks by quickly draining
nodes battery power. These energy draining attacks are not
specific to any specific protocol which are disturbing,
difficult to detect, and are easy to carry out using as few as
one malicious insider sending only protocol compliant
messages. There are a lot of protocols developed to protect
from Denial of Service attack, but it is not completely
possible. One such Denial of Service attack is Vampire
attack-Draining of node life from wireless ad-hoc sensor
networks. This paper presents a method to tolerate the
attack by using the Cluster Head. In case of any energy
draining attack, the Cluster Head engages in the situation
and delivers the packet to destination without dropping the
packet. Thus providing a victorious and reliable message
delivery even in case of Vampire attack. A novel PLGP
method is proposed to mitigate the battery power draining
attacks by improving the existing routing protocol.
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I. Introduction
Wireless ad-hoc Sensor Networks provide one of the
missing connections between the Internet and the physical
world. One of the fundamental problems in sensor
networks is the calculation of coverage. Exposure is
directly related to coverage in that it is a measure of how
well an object, moving on an arbitrary path, can be
observed by the sensor network over a period of time. In
addition to the informal definition, a formal definition is
defined for exposure and study of WSN properties. An
efficient and effective algorithm is developed for
calculation in sensor networks, specifically for finding
minimal exposure paths. The minimal exposure path
provides valuable information about the worst case
exposure based coverage in sensor networks. The
algorithm works for any given distribution of sensors,
sensor and intensity models, and characteristics of the
network. It provides an unbounded level of accuracy as a
function of run time and storage. Attackers may deploy a
few malicious nodes with similar or more hardware
capabilities as the legitimate nodes that might collude to
attack the system cooperatively. The attacker may come
upon these malicious nodes by purchasing them separately,
or by “turning” a few legitimate nodes by capturing them
and physically overwriting their memory. Also, in some
cases colluding nodes might have high-quality
communications links available for coordinating their
attack. The sensor nodes may not be tamper resistant and if
an adversary compromises a node, it can extract all key
material, data, and code stored on that node. As a result,
WSN has to face multiple threats that may easily hinder its
functionality and nullify the benefits of using its services.
Routing and data forwarding is a crucial service for
enabling communication in sensor networks.
Unfortunately, current routing protocols suffer from many
security vulnerabilities. For example, an attacker might
launch denial of service attacks on the routing protocol,
preventing communication. The simplest attacks involve
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injecting malicious routing information into the network,
resulting in routing inconsistencies. Simple authentication
might guard against injection attacks, but some routing
protocols are susceptible to replay by the attacker of
legitimate routing messages. The wireless medium is
inherently less secure because its broadcast nature makes
eavesdropping simple. Any transmission can easily be
intercepted, altered, or replayed by an adversary. The
wireless medium allows an attacker to easily intercept
valid packets and easily inject malicious ones. Although
this problem is not unique to sensor networks, traditional
solutions must be adapted to efficiently execute on sensor
networks.
II. Over View
The extreme resource limitations of sensor devices pose
considerable challenges to resource-hungry security
mechanisms. The hardware constraints necessitate
extremely efficient security node, but a malicious packet
makes its way around the loop twice more before exiting.
Band width, computational complexity, and memory. This
is no trivial task. Energy is the most precious resource for
sensor networks. Communication is especially expensive
in terms of power. Clearly, security mechanisms must give
special effort to be communication efficient in order to be
energy efficient. The proposed scale of sensor networks
poses a significant challenge for security mechanisms.
Simply networking tens to hundreds of thousands of nodes
has proven to be a substantial task. Providing security over
such a network is equally challenging.
Security mechanisms must be scalable to very large
networks while maintaining high computation and
communication efficiency. Depending on the function of
the particular sensor network, the sensor nodes may be left
unattended for long periods of time. In our first attack, an
adversary composes packets with purposely introduced
routing loops. We call it the carousel attack, since it sends
packets in circles as shown in Fig. 1. It targets source
routing protocols by exploiting the limited verification of
message headers at forwarding nodes, allowing a single
packet to repeatedly traverse the same set of nodes. In our
second attack, also targeting source routing, an adversary
constructs artificially long routes, potentially traversing
every node in the network. We call this the stretch attack,
since it increases packet path lengths, causing packets to be
processed by a number of nodes that is independent of hop
count along the shortest path between the adversary and
packet destination.
An example is illustrated in Fig.2. Results show that in a
randomly generated topology, a single attacker can use a
carousel attack to increase energy consumption by as much
as a factor of 4, while stretch attacks increase energy usage
by up to an order of magnitude, depending on the position
of the malicious node. The impact of these attacks can be
further increased by combining them, increasing the
number of adversarial nodes in the network, or simply
sending more packets. Although in networks that do not
employ authentication or only use end-toend
authentication, adversaries are free to replace routes in any
overhead packets, we assume that only messages
originated by Adversaries may have maliciously.
Fig. 2: Honest route is dotted while malicious route is
dashed. The last link to the sink is shared.
III. Protocols and Attacks
In this section we discuss various protocols
proposed for security of wireless sensor networks by
different researchers. We do not imply that power draining
itself is novel, but rather that these attacks have not been
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rigorously defined, evaluated, or mitigated at the routing
layer. A very early mention of power exhaustion can be
found in, as “sleep deprivation torture.” As per the name,
the proposed attack prevents nodes from entering a low-
power sleep cycle, and thus depletes their batteries faster.
Newer research on “denial-of-sleep” only considers attacks
at the MAC layer. Additional work mentions resource
exhaustion at the MAC and transport layers but only offers
rate limiting and elimination of insider adversaries as
potential solutions. Malicious cycles (routing loops) have
been briefly mentioned, but no effective defences are
discussed other than increasing efficiency of the
underlying MAC and routing protocols or switching away
from source routing. Even in non-power-constrained
systems, depletion of resources such as memory, CPU
time, and bandwidth may easily cause problems. A popular
example is the SYN flood attack, wherein adversaries
make multiple connection requests to a server, which will
allocate resources for each connection request, eventually
running out of resources, while the adversary, who
allocates minimal resources, remains operational (since he
does not intend to ever complete the connection
handshake). Such attacks can be defeated or attenuated by
putting greater burden on the connecting entity (e.g., SYN
cookies, which offload the initial connection state onto the
client, or cryptographic puzzles. These solutions place
minimal load on legitimate clients who only initiate a small
number of connections, but deter malicious entities who
will attempt a large number. Note that this is actually a
form of rate limiting, and not always desirable as it
punishes nodes who produce burst traffic but may not send
much total data over the lifetime of the network. Since
Vampire attacks rely on amplification, such solutions may
not be sufficiently effective to justify the excess load on
legitimate nodes.
There is also significant past literature on attacks
and defences against quality of service (QoS) degradation,
or RoQ attacks that produce long-term degradation in net-
work performance. The focus of this work is on the
transport layer rather than routing protocols, so these
defences are not applicable. Moreover, since Vampires do
not drop packets, the quality of the malicious path itself
may remain high (although with increased latency). Other
work on denial of service in ad hoc wireless networks has
primarily dealt with adversaries who prevent route setup,
disrupt communication, or preferentially establish routes
through themselves to drop, manipulate, or monitor
packets. The effect of denial or degradation of service on
battery life and other finite node resources has not
generally been a security consideration, making our work
tangential to the research mentioned above. Protocols that
define security in terms of path discovery success, ensuring
that only valid network paths are found, cannot protect
against Vampire attacks, since Vampires do not use or
return illegal routes or prevent communication in the short
term. Current work in minimal-energy routing, which aims
to increase the lifetime of power-constrained networks by
using less energy to transmit and receive packets (e.g., by
minimizing wireless transmission distance) is likewise
orthogonal: these protocols focus on cooperative nodes and
not malicious scenarios. Additional on power-conserving
MAC, upper layer protocols, and cross-layer cooperation.
However, Vampires will increase energy usage even in
minimal-energy routing scenarios and when power-
conserving MAC protocols are used; these attacks cannot
be prevented at the MAC layer or through cross-layer
feedback. Attackers will produce packets which traverse
more hops than necessary, so even if nodes spend the
minimum required energy to transmit packets, each packet
is still more expensive to transmit in the presence of
Vampires. Our work can be thought of attack-resistant
minimal energy routing, where the adversary’s goal
includes decreasing energy savings. The effect of denial or
degradation of service on battery life and other finite node
resources has not generally been a
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Security consideration, making our work tangential to the
research mentioned above.
Carousel Attack
In this attack, an adversary sends a packet with a
route composed as a series of loops, such that the same
node appears in the route many times. This strategy can be
used to increase the route length beyond the number of
nodes in the network, only limited by the number of
allowed entries in the
Thin shows the malicious path. Fig. 3: shows the carousel
attack same node appears in the route many times
Stretch attack
Source route. An example of this type of route is
in Fig.3 the thick path shows the honest path and  Another
attack in the same vein is the stretch attack, where a
malicious node constructs artificially long source routes,
causing packets to traverse a larger than optimal number of
nodes. In the example given below honest path shown with
thick lines and adversary or malicious path with thin lines.
The honest path is very less distant but the malicious path
is very long to make more Energy consumption.
Fig. 4: Shows Stretch attack with two different
paths from source to destination. (4-9-10-11-12-8-9—long
route).
Per-node energy usage under both attacks is shown in
Fig.5. As expected, the carousel attack causes excessive
energy usage for a few nodes, since only nodes along a
shorter path are affected. In contrast, the stretch attack
shows more energy consumption for all nodes in the
network, since it lengthens the route, causing more nodes
to process the packet. While both attacks significantly
network-wide energy usage, individual nodes are also
noticeably affected,
Fig 5: Node Energy Distribution under Various Attack
Scenarios.With some losing almost 10 percent of their total
energy reserve per message
.
IV. Stateful Protocols and their Attacks
A stateful protocol is where nodes are aware of
their topology, its state, forwarding decisions. It requires
the server to record the transaction so they can be recalled
or resumed. Two important classes are link state and
distance –vector. Example of link-state is OLSR and
example of distance-vector is DSDV. Both these protocols
are proactive, which routes to all reachable nodes in the
network and minimizes the initial delay. OLSR keeps the
record of up and down state of links and flood routing
updates. DSDV is also known as Distributed Bellman-Ford
or RIP (Routing Information Protocol). Every node
maintains a routing table that contains all available
destinations, the next node to reach to destination, the
number of hops to reach the destination and periodically
send table to all neighbours to maintain topology. Both
these protocols are immune to carousel and stretch attacks.
In fact, any time adversaries cannot specify the full path,
the potential for Vampire attack is reduced. Two types of
attacks in stateful protocol are directional antenna attack
and malicious discovery attack. Directional antenna attack:
In this the vampires have little control over the packets
progress, but they still waste energy by restarting a packet
in various parts of network. They will deposit the packets
in arbitrary path of network due to this energy is
consumed, O(d) where d is the network diameter, d/2 .It is
also considered as half worm hole attack. Packet leashes
cannot prevent this kind of attack since they are not meant
to protect against malicious message source but only
intermediary. Malicious Discovery Attack: It is also called
as spurious rote discovery. Both AODV and DSR are
vulnerable to this attack since nodes may initiate discovery
at any time, not just during the topology change. This type
of attack becomes serious when nodes claim that long
distance route has changed. This attack is trivial in open
networks. Packet leashes cannot prevent this type of attack.
This is similar to route flapping in BGP.
V. Stateless Protocols and their Attacks
A stateless protocol does not require the server to
retain session information or status about each
communications partner for the duration of multiple
requests. It is communication protocol that treats ach
request as an independent transaction that is unrelated to
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any previous request so that the communication consists of
independent pairs of requests and responses. The two most
common types of attacks are Carousel attack shown in
Figure [1] and Stretch attack shown in Figure [2]. It is
called Stretch attack, since it increases packet path lengths,
causing packets to be processed by a number of nodes that
is independent of hop count along the shortest path
between the adversary and packet destination. The carousel
on the other hand sends packets in circles. It targets source
routing protocols by exploiting the limited verification of
message headers at forwarding nodes, allowing a single
packet to repeatedly traverse the same set of nodes.
VI. Clean State Secure Routing Protocol (PLGP)
The PLGP protocol is modified as clean state
secure routing protocol such that they can resist vampire
attacks during the forwarding. PLGP was vulnerable to
vampire attacks even though they were said to be secured.
When the route discovery begins each node has a limited
view about the network. As already said nodes discover the
other nodes in a group by broadcasting a certificate id,
signed by the public key of the online authority, thus
forming a single group and a tree structure that will be
used for addressing and routing. All nodes compute the
same address as the other odes they also learn each other’s
virtual address as well as their cryptographic keys. The
final address is verifiable after the network convergence
and all forwarding decisions can be independently verified.
PLGP consists of a topology discovery phase, followed by
a packet forwarding phase, with the former optionally
repeated on a fixed schedule to ensure that topology
information stays current. (There is no on- demand
discovery.) Discovery deterministically organizes nodes
into a tree that will later be used as an addressing scheme.
When discovery begins, each node has a limited view of
the network—the node knows only itself. Nodes discover
their neighbours using local broadcast, and form ever
expanding “neighbourhoods,” stopping when the entire
network is a single group. Throughout this process, nodes
build a tree of neighbour relationships and group member-
ship that will later be used for addressing and routing.
At the end of discovery, each node should
compute the same address tree as other nodes. All leaf
nodes in the tree are physical nodes in the network, and
their virtual addresses correspond to their position in the
tree (see Fig. 6). All nodes learn each other’s’ virtual
addresses and cryptographic keys. The final address tree is
verifiable after network convergence, and all forwarding
decisions can be independently verified. Furthermore,
assuming each legitimate network node has a unique
certificate of membership (assigned before network
deployment), nodes who attempt to join multiple groups,
produce clones of themselves in multiple locations, or
otherwise cheat during discovery can be identified and
evicted.
A. Provable Security against Vampire Attacks
Here, we modify the forwarding phase of PLGP
to provably avoid the above-mentioned attacks. First we
introduce the no backtracking property, satisfied for a
given packet if and only if it consistently makes progress
toward its destination in the logical network address space.
More formally:
Definition 1. No-backtracking is satisfied if every packet p
traverses the same number of hops whether or not an
adversary is present in the network. (Maliciously induced
route stretch is bounded to a factor of 1.)
This does not imply that every packet in the network must
travel the same number of hops regardless of source or
destination, but rather that a packet sent to node D by a
malicious node at location L will traverse the same number
of hops as a packet sent to D by a node at location L that is
honest. If we think of this in terms of protocol execution
traces, no-backtracking implies that for each packet in the
trace, the number of intermediate honest nodes traversed
by the packet between source and destination is
independent of the actions of malicious nodes.
Equivalently, traces that include malicious nodes should
show the same network- wide energy utilization by honest
nodes as traces of a network with no malicious actors. The
only notable exceptions are when adversaries drop or
mangle packets en route, but since we are only concerned
with packets initiated by adversaries, we can safely ignore
this situation: “premangled” packets achieve the same
result—they will be dropped by an honest intermediary or
destination. No-backtracking implies Vampire resistance.
It is not immediately obvious why no-backtracking
prevents Vampire attacks in the forwarding phase. Recall
the reason for the success of the stretch attack:
intermediate nodes in a source route cannot check whether
the source-defined route is optimal, or even that it makes
progress toward the destination. When nodes make
independent routing decisions such as in link-state,
distance vector, coordinate-based, or beacon-based
protocols, packets cannot contain maliciously composed
routes. This already means the adversary cannot perform
carousel or stretch attacks— no node may unilaterally
specify a suboptimal path through the network. However, a
sufficiently clever adversary may still influence packet
progress. We can prevent this interference by
independently checking on packet progress: if nodes keep
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track of route “cost” or metric and, when forwarding a
packet, communicate the local cost to the next hop, that
next hop can verify that the remaining route cost is lower
than before, and therefore the packet is making progress
toward its destination. (Otherwise we suspect malicious
intervention and drop the packet.) If we can guarantee that
a packet is closer to its destination with every hop, we can
bound the potential damage from an attacker as a function
of network size. (A more desirable property is to guarantee
good progress, such as logarithmic path length, but both
allow us to obtain an upper bound on attack success.)
Definition 2. The hop count of packet p received or
forwarded by an honest node, is no greater than the number
of entries in p’s route attestation field, plus 1.
When any node receives a message, it checks that every
node in the path attestation 1) has a corresponding entry in
the signature chain, and 2) is logically closer to the
destination than the previous hop in the chain (see
Function secure_forward_packet). This way, forward- ing
nodes can enforce the forward progress of a message,
preserving no-backtracking. If no attestation is present, the
node checks to see if the originator of the message is a
physical neighbour. Since messages are signed with the
originator’s key, malicious nodes cannot falsely claim to
be the origin of a message, and therefore do not benefit by
removing attestations.
VII. Modules
A. Topology Discovery and Cluster Head Selection
The topology we are going to use here is a mesh
topology. In this case each node sends a message to the
other nodes which it detects. Once a node detects the
message it maintains a record to store information about
the neighbour. Using multicast socket all nodes are used to
detect their elected based on range, mobility and battery
power
Fig: 6. Topology Discovery and Cluster Head Selection
B. Tree Formation and Route Discovery
Trees are formed as nodes form group. Each node
starts with group size 1 and virtual address 0 so that one
group is formed. Similarly other groups are also formed.
When two nodes form a group their size becomes 2 with
one node taking a virtual address 0 and other taking the
address 1.Each group can have their own group address.
Example: node 0 in one group 0 becomes 0.0 and node 0 in
group 1 becomes 1.0. Each time a group is added or
merged the address of each node is lengthened by one bit.
Thus a tree structure is formed with address in the network
and node
Address as leaves. Generally small groups form with 1
node
Later they merge to form large groups.
Fig: 7.Group identification
For example when two groups merge to form a large group
they broadcast their group id to each other and precede
with the merge protocols. Each node stores the id of one or
more nodes such that neighbour node. Cluster Head is they
can know that the other group exists such that every node
within a group will end up with the next-hop path to every
other group as in distance vector. Thus a tree is formed and
the route is chosen in this manner until all network nodes
are members of single group. By the end of this phase each
node.
C. Forwarding the Packets
During this phase each node is independent of other
node and hence the decision made by them is also
independent. When a node receives a packet it determines
the next hop by finding the most significant bit(MSB)
address as it differs from the message originators address
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as it differs from the originators address.When a packet is
moving within a group and when they want to move to the
next group they shortens the logical distance to destination
since their address must be close to the destination.
Fig: 8.Message traversal in normal situation.
Fig: 9. Vampire Attack leading to message drop.
Fig: 10. After N trials node N3 sends data to cluster head
(chosen based on highest coverage range, battery power)
which sends data to sink.
VIII. Conclusion
In this paper we talk about Vampire attacks, a
new class of resource consumption attacks that use routing
protocols to permanently disable ad-hoc wireless sensor
networks by depleting nodes’ battery power. We showed a
number of proof of-concept attacks against representative
examples of existing routing protocols. We also saw how
to overcome vampire attacks thus increasing the energy of
the node by a factor of O (N) per adversary per packet,
where N is the network size. We defined about PLGP the
first sensor network routing protocol that provably bounds
damage from vampire attacks by verifying the packets
towards the destination. We have not offered a fully
satisfactory solution for Energy draining attacks during the
topology discovery phase, but suggested some intuition
about damage limitations possible with further
modifications to PLGP. Derivation of damage bounds
anddefences for topology discovery, as well as handling
mobile networks, is left for future work.
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